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Abstract— In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to 
provide security for various information and communication systems. 
Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before 
they are used in practice. Application of formal methods for 
verification of security protocols would enhance their reliability 
thereby, increasing the usability of systems that employ them. Thus, 
formal verification of security protocols has become a key issue in 
computer and communications security. In this paper we present, 
analyze and compare some prevalent approaches towards 
verification of secure systems. We follow the notion of - same goal 
through different approaches - as we formally analyze the Needham 
Schroeder Public Key protocol for Lowe’s attack using each of our 
presented approaches. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Security protocols and algorithms are often used to ensure 
secure communication in a hostile environment. Today, the 
need of security and privacy in active information and 
communication domains such as e-commerce; mobile 
technologies and the internet has necessitated the use of 
security protocols. But the underlying security protocols used 
in these applications are vulnerable to a variety of attacks, such 
as message replay, parallel session, data interception and/or 
manipulation, repudiation and impersonation. Therefore before 
trusting security protocols, it becomes imperative for a systems 
designer to have some degree of assurance that these protocols 
fulfill their intended objectives. 
Formal verification is the use of mathematical techniques to 
ensure that a design conforms to some precisely expressed 
notion of functional correctness. Traditionally, security 
protocols had been designed and analyzed heuristically. The 
absence of formal methods for verification could lead to 
security errors remaining undetected. Formal verification 
techniques, on the other hand, provide a systematic way of 
discovering protocol flaws. They can be applied to designs 
described at many different levels of abstraction, ranging from 
the gate level, to RTL implementations, and in some cases even 
to transaction level models described in standardized 
programming languages [1]. Besides the conformity of 
correctness, formal methods, when used in the design phases of 
a system’s development often result in more accurate and 
lower cost systems. 
Unfortunately, these protocol verification methodologies 
are very complex and cannot be easily implemented by 
protocol engineers [19]. There is also a deep sense of distrust in 
the academic community about the different verification 
techniques and their competence in determining prospective 
design and implementation flaws in complex systems [20, 21]. 
Therefore through this paper, we intend to present, compare 
and analyze a few most prevalent approaches towards formal 
verification of security protocols.   
To achieve our objective we introduce four well known 
verification approaches – the sequential programming 
approach; the logic programming approach; the strand spaces 
approach and the belief based approach – falling under the 
broader domains of model checking and logical inference.  
Each of the above mention methodologies are applied to 
formally verify the Needham Schroeder Public Key protocol 
[3] for Lowe’s attack[4]. In the process of doing so, we 
compare these approaches for their specification ease, 
competence in determining complex security flaws; and 
computational costs. We also make an explicit mention of the 
advantages and limitations of using these approaches in 
verifying similar systems. 
In section II of the paper we present our literature study by 
giving a brief mention of what model checking and logical 
inference approaches are. Section III, introduces the Needham 
Schroeder Public Key protocol (NSPK) and the classical 
Lowe’s attack on it. In the section IV we elaborate on our 
presented verification approaches by proving the validity of the 
Lowe’s attack on the NSPK protocol using each approach 
explicitly. Section V presents a detailed comparison between 
the approaches explained in section IV. Section VI, gives a 
brief mention of our intention of future work. Finally, we 
conclude the paper in section VII, followed by references in 
section VIII. 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
Formal verification aims at providing a rigid and thorough 
means of evaluating the correctness of a security protocol so 
that even subtle defects can be uncovered. These methods 
include mathematical analysis dependant on logical analysis or 
process algebras. Though there are numerous approaches and 
formal methods that could be employed for verification of a 
security protocol. These approaches can be broadly classified 
into two domains namely, model checking and logical 
inferences. 
The first approach is model checking [2], which consists of 
a systematically exhaustive exploration of the mathematical 
model. Usually this consists of exploring all states and 
transitions in the model, by using smart and domain-specific 
abstraction techniques to consider whole groups of states in a 
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single operation and reduce computing time. Model Checking, 
one of many formal verification methods, is an attractive and 
increasingly appealing alternative to simulation and testing to 
validate and verify systems [2].  Given a system model and 
desired system properties, the Model Checker explores the full 
state space of the system model to check whether the given 
system properties are satisfied by the model. In this paper, we 
present the logic programming approach [5, 6, 10] under the 
model checker domain, with smodels [25] and lparse [12] as a 
model finder and grounded program generator respectively. 
Another suggested includes the sequential programming 
approach [15] with FDR [27] as its model checker. 
        The second approach is logical inference. It consists of 
using a formal version of mathematical reasoning about the 
system. This approach is usually only partially automated and 
is driven by the user's understanding of the system to validate.  
The suggested approaches under this domain are BAN Logic 
[22, 23]  and the Strand Spaces approach[24]. 
III. NEEDHAM SCHRODER PUBLIC KEY PROTOCOL 
 Proposed by Roger Needham and Michael Schroder, 
NSPK protocol [3] claims to provide mutual authentication 
between two agents, along with establishing a session between 
the communicating parties, in a public key cryptography based 
system. For the description of the protocol we would assume 
that A and B are two honest agents and S is a trusted server. 
The notation used is - KPX and KSX are the public and private 
keys of agent X.  
 
Protocol Run: 
1) A Æ S: A, B (A requests B's public key from S) 
2) S Æ A: {KPB, B}Kss (S responds. B's identity is send along 
with KPB for confirmation) 
3) A Æ B: {Na, A}KPB (A sends a fresh nonce Na to B) 
4) B Æ S: B, A (B requests S for A’s public key) 
5) S Æ B: {KPA, A}Kss (S sends the public key of A to B) 
6) B Æ A: {Na, Nb}KPA (B generates a fresh nonce Nb and 
sends it back to A, along with A’s nonce Na) 
7) A Æ{Nb}KPB (A confirms Nb to B) 
At the end of the protocol, A and B know each other's 
identities, and know both Na and Nb. These nonces are not 
known to eavesdroppers.  
Attack on the NSPK protocol: Gavin Lowe proposed an 
attack on NSPK using CSP modeling technique and FDR 
model checking tool [4]. Lowe claimed that the protocol is 
vulnerable to Man in the Middle Attack, wherein an adversary 
I, who is responding to a protocol run initiated by A,  can 
falsely authenticate itself to an agent B as A, by replaying A’s 
message to B. Thus, B is fooled to belief that a session is 
established between A and B. In the explanation of the attack 
and its analysis, we will ignore the messages transmitted to 
and from a trusted server S (message 1, 2, 4 and 5) which 
remain unchanged in an attack run. 
Lowe’s Attack on NSPK: 
1.1) A Æ I: {Na, A}KPI (A sends a fresh nonce Na to I) 
2.1) I(A) Æ B: {Na, A}KPB (In a parallel run of the protocol, I 
masquerading as A, relays the message received from A 
after encrypting it under B’s public key.) 
2.2) B Æ I(A): {Na, Nb}KPA (B responds to I’s message) 
1.2) I Æ A: {Na, Nb}KPA (I relays B’s message to A) 
1.3) A Æ I: {Nb}KPI (A returns Nb to complete protocol run 
with I) 
2.3) I(A) Æ B: {Nb}KPB (I masquerade A and forwards Nb 
encrypted under B’s public key) 
In the next section, different verification approaches are 
applied to formally analyze NSPK protocol for a security 
violation that corresponds to Lowe’s attack and produce 
results similar to those stated above. 
IV. APPROACHES TO FORMAL VERIFICATION 
A. The Strand Spaces Approach 
Strand Spaces proposed by Fábrega et al in [24] is a 
mathematical technique for formal verification of security 
protocols. A strand represents the chronological sequence of 
the messages transferred during a protocol run. These 
messages can be sent or received by either legitimate parties 
or the adversary.  The collection of strands of all the parties 
participating in the protocol run is known as a Strand Space.  
 
 This technique provides a distinguished approach for 
protocol verification with intelligent and reliable proofs even 
without automated support. It works with the explicit model 
of possible behavior of system penetrator and also provides 
clear semantics about data items like nonce and session keys. 
It also provides proofs of notions of correctness of both 
secrecy and authentication. It also provides the detailed insight 
into why certain assumptions are required to prove the 
correctness. 
TABLE 1 
TERMINOLOGY USED  
A 
Message Space. It has two disjoint subsets: 
• T: set of atomic text messages 
• K: set of cryptographic keys 
<σ,a>  
Signed Term: + represent sent message, - represents received 
message. 
(tr, Σ)  Trace mapping of a participant. It represents the set of messages sent or received by a participant. 
 
 
Subterm relation. e.g. m {m}K but K {m}K iff 
K  m 
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n1⇒ n2 Node n1 is the immediate causal predecessor of n2  
n1→ n2  There is a causal link between the nodes n1 and n2  
 
Proof of Needham – Schroeder Public Key Protocol 
 
PROTOCOL AIM: 
This protocol intends that after the successful run of the 
protocol, the communicating parties share access to Na and Nb 
and no other party should have access to these values. 
 
DEFINITION: Let ∑ be the NSPK strand space. It is the union 
of following strands: 
• Initiator Strand: The Initiator Strand has the trace Init 
[A, B, Na, Nb]. 
• Responder Strand: The Responder Strand is 
complementary to the Initiator strand and has the 
trace Resp [A, B, Na, Nb]. 
• Penetrator Strand P. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
• Each participant has the knowledge of other 
participant’s public key. 
• Each participant has different public key. According 
to this condition if KA = KB ⇒ A = B and vice versa. 
• Nonce values {Na, Nb }≠ {A, B}. This implies that 
name of any participant is not used as nonce value. 
 
PROOF  
Figure 1 represents the ideal NSPK strand space. Here ‘i’ 
represents the initiator strand while ‘s’ represents the 
responder strand. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Responder’s Guarantee 
Given  
• ∑ is the NSPK strand space and C is a bundle that 
has the responder strand s with trace Resp[A, B, Na, 
Nb]; 
• KA-1 ∉ KP where KP represents the set of keys know to 
penetrator P; 
• Na ≠ Nb and Nb originates uniquely in ∑. 
Then there exists an initiator strand ‘i’ in bundle C with trace 
Init [A, B, Na, Nb]. 
 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 represents the legitimate responder’s strand.  
To prove the proposition we will take help of certain lemmas. 
We rename node <s, 2> where responder sends message {Na, 
Nb}KA as a0 and its term as t0. We also refer node <s, 3> where 
responder receive the message {Nb}KB as a3 and its term as t3.  
 
LEMMA 1.1: Nb originates at t0. 
Proof: By observing Figure 2 we find that Nb  a0 which is 
a positive node. Now the only node preceding a0 on responder 
strand is <s, 1>. We just have to check that Nb term<s, 1>, 
i.e. Nb ≠ Na and Nb ≠ A. Both of these follow from our 
hypothesis. Hence we can say that Nb originates at a0. 
Next lemma checks that whether the step 3 of the protocol is 
taken by the legitimate party or the penetrator.  
LEMMA 1.2: Given set S = { n є C : Nb term(n) ^ t0  
term(n)}. Set S has a minimal node t2. The node t2 is positive 
and regular. 
Proof: It can be seen that a3 є S. Hence S is non empty and 
contains a minimal node a2. Since a2 is minimal node its sign is 
positive. We will now check that whether a2 lies on a 
penetrator strand or not. We will examine the possible types of 
penetrator traces. 
<+t> : If trace(p) is of this form than Nb = t. This implies that 
Nb originates on this strand which contradicts the result of 
Lemma 1.1 
<-g>: This trace lacks any positive node and hence cannot be 
minimal node. 
<-g, +g, +g>: In this case positive nodes do not have minimal 
occurrence. 
<-g, -h, +gh>: In this case positive nodes do not have minimal 
occurrence. 
<+K0>: Here K0 є KP. But since from our assumption, text and 
keys belong to disjoint sets this cannot be possible. 
<- K0-1, -{h}K0, +h>: If the positive node is minimal then t0 
but t0 {h}K0. Hence K0 = KA. This contradicts our 
assumption that KA-1 ∉ KP 
Therefore a2 does not lie on a penetrator strand but it must 
belong to a regular strand. 
 
LEMMA 1.3: A node a1 precedes a2 on the same regular 
strand and term(a1) = {Na, Nb}KA. 
Nb originates uniquely in ∑. Also a2 ≠ a0 which follows from 
above proved lemma. Therefore there should be some node a1 
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preceding a2 such that Nb term (a1). Since node a2 is 
minimal term (n1) = {Na, Nb}KA. 
 
LEMMA 1.4: The regular strand i containing a1 and a2 is the 
initiator strand and this strand has trace Init [A, B, Na, Nb]. 
With the weaker information proved in above lemmas we 
cannot conclude that i has a trace of the form Init [A, B, Na, 
Nb]. This is because the responder’s identity is not determined 
by the term {Na, Nb}KA, which is what this agreement protocol 
is all about. We can only conclude that strand t belonging to 
user A has trace Init [A, X, Na, Nb] where X can be some party 
with which A is communicating. This results corresponds to 
the Lowe’s attack suggested in section III. 
B. THE LOGIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH 
In this section we use ALSP (Action Language for Security 
Protocols[5, 6] as an efficient specification language to 
formally analyze the NSPK protocol[3]. ALSP is an 
executable language for representing protocols and checking 
for security violations they are vulnerable to [6, 10].  
Specification of a protocol in ALSP requires inculcation of 
concepts of robotic planning[13]. Security protocols are 
reframed as planning problems, where agents exchange 
messages and are subject to attacks by intruders. The 
specification of a protocol in ALSP is viewed as a plan to 
achieve a goal and the attacks become plans, which achieve 
goals that correspond to security violations. 
 
 ALSP is based on LPSM(Logic Programming with 
Stable Model Semantics) [7, 9]. Logic Programming[8] 
enables one with declarative ease to specify the actions of the 
different agents in a protocol. This includes both the 
operational behavior of a protocol, along with the possible 
security attacks of an intruder. All stable models[11] for the 
solution set of logic programs in ALSP are minimal and 
grounded in nature[9]. Minimalism allows one to determine 
exactly what happened when a protocol specification was 
executed. It ensures that all unwanted models are not a part of 
our solution set. Groundedness, on the other hand ensures that 
everything present in the solution set has a justification behind 
its presence[5]. 
 
 A logic program is written as a set of Horn clauses 
known as rules. We formalize and frame all actions in a 
protocol specification as logic programming rules[6]. A rule 
comprises of a head and a body, separated by a [:-]. The left 
hand side head literals hold true if all the literals on the right 
hand side body are true. A syntactically correct example of a 
rule in logic programming would be:  
q:- p, s. 
Let P be the logic program with S being the solution set for P. 
Then the above rule could be read as, if the literals s and p 
belong to the solution set S then q must also belong to the 
solution set S. Here the rule is a constraint on the solution set. 
  
 To develop the protocol specification for NSPK, 
initially a general description of the background and action 
theories pertaining to the protocol is specified in ALSP. This 
is followed by defining, the choice rules representing the 
correct execution of the protocol and the actual specification 
of the protocol dependant itself. Last but not the least; we 
define a rule corresponding to the security property we want to 
check. Then, the above specifications are merged and a 
maximum execution time for the protocol run is determined. 
Setting bounds on basic objects like nonces, devices, random 
values, etc we use lparse[12] as a suitable front end to the 
smodels[25] system to generate a grounded logic program 
from our specification. Finally this grounded logic program is 
executed in smodels to find stable models corresponding to  
violations. 
 
Development of Protocol Specification for Needham – 
Schroeder Public Key Protocol: 
 We start specifying the protocol by considering basic 
sort predicates to characterize the basic components of NSPK. 
We state clearly the background theory (initial state of the 
protocol) which contains rules describing, how a message is 
composed and decrypted by the agents. It also includes the 
properties of keys shared and how information is attained by 
agents participating in a protocol. A few basic sort predicates 
used in our protocol specification are, nonce(N), agent(A) 
time(T). The names of these predicates are intuitive and 
represent properties and functions of these predicates. A 
special sort predicate msg(M) is also defined, which means 
that M  is a valid message that may appear in a protocol run. 
Then, we specify a few basic constructors that symbolize 
cryptographic operations, concatenations and hashing of 
messages as required by the protocol. Table 2, represents a 
few classical constructs used in the protocol specification.  
 
TABLE 2 
CONSTRUCTS USED IN NSPK SPECIFICATION 
encrypt(K, M) 
 
Denotes an encryption of the message M using 
symmetric key K. 
concat(A, B) 
 Denotes concatenation of messages A and B (A||B) 
 
We also specify predicates that define the properties of 
messages and keys that are used in the protocol. In addition to 
this, definition of the ability of agents to construct, send, 
receive and understand these messages is also an imminent 
part of our protocol specification. As suggested in [6], the 
predicate names in most part of our ALSP specification for 
NSPK are fairly intuitive and represent the action or property 
after which they are named. Table 3, gives a brief mention of 
these predicates. 
 
TABLE 3 
PREDICATE NAMES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
part(M,M1) Denotes M as a submessage of M1 
verifier(V,A,B) Denotes V as a verifier shared between agents A and B 
knows(A,M,T) 
 Denotes agent A knows message M at time T 
synth(A,M,T) Denotes agent A synthesizes message M at time T 
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says(A,B,M,T) 
 
Denotes agent A’s attempt of sending the 
message M to agent B 
gets(A,M,T) Denotes agent A’s receipt of message M at time T 
  
 Having known all the constructs and predicates 
required for our specification of NSPK. We initiate the 
specification of the background theory, beginning with the 
messages that can be used in the protocol. In ALSP it is 
deemed sufficient to specify the valid messages, along with all 
their sub messages for a protocol run [13,14]. This is an 
important step which ensures that the ALSP specification is 
admissible [6, 10]. NSPK being a three step protocol, we can 
easily distinguish the three messages along with their sub 
messages, transmitted at different stages of its execution. To 
enhance the readability of our specification, we have avoided 
using the sort predicates in the body clause of our rules. We 
have also used the more prevalent notation(Table 1) for its 
description henceforth. For example, xor(M1,M2) has been 
simply written as M1 ⊕ M2 and concat(M1,M2) as M1||M2. 
  
 The protocol specification should also represent the 
ability of agents to modify and manipulate messages. 
 
msg(encrypt(K, N, A)):- 
 nonce(N), agent(A), publicKey(K, A). 
msg(encrypt(K, N)):- 
 nonce(N), publicKey(K, A). 
msg(N||A)):- 
 nonce(N), agent(A). 
 
 To do this message parts are inductively defined 
based on the protocol constructors. Most of this specification 
is independent of the protocol itself and represents message 
part defining rules, incorporated from [5]. 
 
part(M,M) :-msg(M). 
part(M,M1||M2):- msg(M), msg(M1),msg(M2),part(M,M1). 
part(M, M1||M2):- msg(M),msg(M1),msg(M2),part(M,M2). 
 
 Modeling of knowledge is also an important aspect of 
the protocol specification in ALSP. Intuitively, the knows 
predicate is used for the purpose. This includes modeling the 
abilities of agents to acquire information from messages they 
have either received or transmitted. We also define that if an 
agent possesses the knowledge of a message M2 then, he/she 
would also possess the knowledge of a message M1 which is a 
sub message of M2. This enables the agent to extract useful 
message parts from concatenated or exored messages. 
 
knows(A, M, T):- said(A, B, M, T) 
knows(A, M, T):- got(A, M, T) 
knows(A, M, T):- knows(A, M1, T), part(M, M1) 
knows(A, M, T):- knows(A, M1||M2, T), part(M, M1) 
 
 Similarly we specify the ability of an agent to 
synthesize a message in a protocol run. The rules defining the 
synthesis of messages ensure that an agent can construct a 
message if and only if it can construct and thereby knows, all 
the subparts of that message. 
 
synth(A, M, T):-knows(A, M, T) 
synth(A, prf(M1, M2), T):-knows(A, M1, T),  
       knows(A, M1, T) 
 
 Knowledge modeling, description of messages and 
specification of the ability of agents to synthesize valid 
messages in a protocol run concludes our background theory 
for NSPK. Next, comes the specification of the action theory 
for the protocol. Most of the specification in this part is 
protocol independent and we refer to [6] for a detailed 
description. 
 
got(B, M, T+1):-gets(B, M, T) 
said(A, B, M, T+1):-says(A, B, M, T) 
got(B, M, T+1):-got(B, M, T) 
said(A, B, M, T+1):-said(A, B, M, T) 
 
 Next we define with the help of a choice rule the 
receiving of messages by an agent the protocol. The rule 
below suggests that if A sends the message msg(M) to B at 
time T, then B may/may not receive it. This relieves us from 
explicitly modeling the faulty transmission behavior or 
message interception. 
 
gets(B, M, T):-says(A, B, M, T) 
 
 We use similar choice rules to describe the abilities 
of an intruder. In this protocol description and intruder spy can 
eavesdrop and receive any message from a protocol run. It can 
also transmit valid messages to honest agents, given that it is 
able to synthesize them. 
 
gets(spy, M, T):-says(A, B, M, T), A!=spy, B!=spy 
says(spy, B, M, T):- synth(spy, M, T), B!=spy 
 
 We then define the rules that specify a protocol’s 
action. This being a protocol dependant part, we have to 
ensure that desirable constraints are imparted on our solution 
set. To do this we put the same preconditions to each action in 
a protocol run, as assumed in our initial description of the 
protocol. We also specify message validation rules, which 
enable the agents to proceed in a protocol run, only if a 
message or its component has been verified. 
 
says(A,B,encrypt(K, Na, A),T):- 
 fresh(Na, T), publicKey(K, B), A!=B 
 
says(B,A,encrypt(K, Na, Na,T):- 
 got(B,encrypt(K, Na, A),T), fresh(Nb, T), 
 publicKey(K, A), A!=B 
 
says(A,B,encrypt(K, Nb),T):- 
 said(A,B,encrypt(K, Na, A),T), 
 got(A,encrypt(K, Na, Na,T), 
 publicKey(K, B), A!=B 
 
 This completes our background and action theories 
for the ALSP specification of the NSPK protocol. In the 
coming section we formally verify the protocol with the above 
specification and validate security claims earlier proposed by 
the protocol. 
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Planning Attacks on the NSPK  
 We specify goals using logic programming rules and 
execute our specification to see if there exists a model where 
the particular goal state is attained. If true, we deduce that the 
protocol can be manipulated to attain the security violation 
and state declaratively that the protocol is insecure. Similarly 
if a model is not generated we claim that the security violation 
can not be achieved hence, the protocol is secure. Again, we 
incorporate the approach as suggested in [6, 10] to specify our 
goals in ALSP. For example, a logic programming rule 
‘attack1’ representing a state when an adversary has attained a 
sessions key by manipulating a protocol run could be written 
as: 
 
attack1(T):- 
 got(B,encrypt(Kb,Na),T), 
 said(B,A,encrypt(Ka,Na,Nb),T), 
 got(B,encrypt(Kb,Nb),T), 
 not said(A,B, encrypt(Kb,Na),T), 
 not said(A,B, encrypt(Kb,Nb),T), A!=spy, 
 B!=spy. 
Result Set: 
C:>lparse nspk.lp attack1.lp | smodels  
smodels version 2.26. Reading...done 
Answer: 1 
True 
Duration 109.827 
Number of choice points: 208 
Number of wrong choices: 24 
Number of atoms: 125348 
Number of rules: 1040351 
Number of picked atoms: 254233 
Number of forced atoms: 436 
Number of truth assignments: 40149094 
Size of searchspace (removed): 752 (221) 
 
The model generated corresponds to that suggested in section 
III for Lowe’s [4] attack on NSPK. 
C. THE SEQUENTIAL PROGRAMMING APPROACH 
CSP (Communicating Sequential Process) is a process algebra 
notation, for analysis of interaction between two or more 
processes, or between a process and its external environment 
[15, 16]. It allows a system to be described at any level of 
abstraction. FDR (Failure Divergence Refinement) [27] is a 
model checking tool based upon CSP theory for concurrent 
processes. FDR takes the system specification and 
implementation of a protocol in CSP script as input and 
produces a counterexample as output, if the implementation 
doesn't meet the given specification. FDR uses the technique 
of searching the state space to find any insecure sequences of 
messages that can occur leading to an attack on the protocol. 
Thus, FDR can only be used for finite systems.  Gavin 
Lowe[4] used CSP and FDR to break and fix the Needham-
Schroeder authentication protocol. 
 
 In order to model a protocol in CSP, each entity 
participating in the protocol is represented as a CSP process 
which communicate over channels. An intruder that can 
interact with the protocol is also modeled as a CSP process. 
Conventionally, the channel’s names are of the form 
x(in/out)y, where in/out refers to the direction (relative to x), 
and y is the other party of the communication. For details on 
the most frequently used notations, please refer Table 1. For 
the complete list, refer [15, 16]. 
 
Analysis of Needham Schroeder Protocol using CSP and 
FDR: 
An agent can either act as initiator (Send) or responder (Resp) 
of the protocol. 
 
User(id,ns) = if ns == <> then STOP else 
       Send(id,ns) [] Resp(id,ns) 
 
 The initiator agent chooses the agent with whom it 
wants to establish a session and then communicates the three 
messages of the NSPK protocol with it. After the three 
messages, the initiator enters a state wherein a session is 
established between the two parties. Similarly, the responder 
performs the three messages. 
 
Send(id,ns) = |~| a:diff(agents,{id}) @  
comm.id.a.pke(pk(a),Sq.<head(ns),id>) -> 
([] n:nonces @  
          
comm.a.id.pke(pk(id),Sq.<n,head(ns)>) ->  
          comm.id.a.pke(pk(a),n) ->  
          Session(id,a,n,tail(ns))) 
 
Resp(id,ns) = [] a:diff(agents,{id}) @  
              [] n:nonces @ 
        comm.a.id.pke(pk(id),Sq.<n,a>) -> 
                      
comm.id.a.pke(pk(a),Sq.<head(ns),n>) -> 
         comm.a.id.pke(pk(id),head(ns)) 
->Session(id,a,head(ns),tail(ns)) 
 
The set of messages are specified as follows. Here message4 is 
included to check for secrecy of nonces. 
 
message1 = {pke(k,Sq.<n,a>) | k <- publickey, n <- 
nonces, a <- agents} 
comm1 = {a.b.m | m <- message1, a<-agents, b<-
agents, a!=b} 
message2 = {pke(k,Sq.<n,n'>) | k <- publickey, n <- 
nonces, n' <- nonces} 
comm2 = {a.b.m | m <- message2, a<-agents, b<-
agents, a!=b} 
message3 = {pke(k,n) | k <- publickey, n <- nonces} 
comm3 = {a.b.m | m <- message3, a<-agents, b<-
agents, a!=b} 
message4 = {encrypt(n,m) | n <- nonces, m <- 
wholemess} 
comm4 = {a.b.m | m <- message4, a<-agents, b<-
agents, a!=b} 
 
 An intruder can listen to messages between Alice and 
Bob, can interact with them, and can even intercept and fake 
messages. An intruder can also deduce facts to build 
messages. A deduction is a pair (X, a) where X is a finite set 
of facts and a is a fact which can be constructed using X. The 
three deductions rules – for sequencing, symmetric keys, and 
asymmetric keys – are specified as: 
 
deductions1(X) = {({Sq . m}, nth(j,m)) , 
({nth(i,m) | i <-{0..#m-1}}, Sq . m) | 
Sq.m <- X, j<-{0..#m-1}} 
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Terms Notation Description 
Process and Event P = a->Q process P performs event a and then behaves like process Q 
External/Deterministic Choice a->P [] b->Q a process which can either perform event a and then behave like P, or perform event 
b and then behave like Q, according to whichever event (a or b) is first recorded 
Internal/Nondeterministic 
Choice 
a->P |~| b->Q Same as external choice except the decision of choice is internal to the process and 
ambiguous to the environment 
Input c ? x inputs value x from channel c 
Output c ! x outputs value x on channel c 
Concurrency P [|X|] Q processes P and Q synchronize on all events in X 
Interleaving P [|{}|] Q processes P and Q run completely independent of each other 
Indexed External Choice []x:Z @ x->P Equivalent to a->P [] b->P [] c->P for Z = {a, b, c} 
(similarly Indexed Internal Choice is defined) 
Communication comm.v value v of the message is communicated on channel comm 
Special Processes STOP does nothing, represents a deadlock  
SKIP represents successful termination 
TABLE 4 
TERMS AND NOTATIONS USED IN CSP SPECIFICATION OF NSPK 
 
deductions2(X) = {({m, k}, encrypt(k,m) ) , 
({encrypt(k,m), k}, m) | 
Encrypt.(k,m) <- X} 
 
deductions3(X) = {({m, k}, pke(k,m) ) , 
({pke(k,m), dual(k)}, m) | 
PK.(k,m) <- X} 
 
 The protocol goals – after a successful run of the 
protocol, the intruder should not possess secret nonces and a 
session is established between the communicating parties – are 
also specified as part of the CSP file. This file is given as input 
to the FDR which shows the Lowe’s attack. For the complete 
code, please refer [16] and [17]. 
 
Casper: 
 Modeling in CSP has been proven to be tedious and 
error prone. Producing a CSP description of a protocol is very 
time-consuming, and also demands expertise in CSP. Casper 
[26], a modeling tool, was built by Lowe to generate the CSP 
code of a protocol from a more abstract description of it. The 
auto-generated CSP code by Casper can then be used for 
checking using FDR. Casper input file consists of two major 
parts – a generic definition of the way in which the protocol 
operates and a definition of the actual system to be checked. 
Each part contains several subsections like Free Variables, 
Intruder Information, Protocol Description, Specification, 
System, etc. with the line beginning with ‘#’. 
 In Casper, the sequence of messages for the Needham 
Schroeder protocol is defined as below. Message 0 says the 
environment sends the identity of B to A, implying A is the 
initiator of the protocol with B as responder. 
#Protocol description 
0.    -> A : B 
1.  A -> B : {na, A}{PK(B)} 
2.  B -> A : {na, nb}{PK(A)} 
3.  A -> B : {nb}{PK(B)}  
 
The goal to be achieved by the protocol is specified as: 
#Specification 
Secret(A, na, [B]) 
Secret(B, nb, [A]) 
Agreement(A,B,[na,nb]) 
Agreement(B,A,[na,nb]) 
Please refer [17] for the complete code. 
D. THE BAN LOGIC APPROACH 
BAN logic was proposed by Mike Burrows, Martín Abadí, 
Roger Needham in [22]. It allows the assumptions and goals 
of a protocol to be stated abstractly in belief logic. According 
to it messages send by any user contains his beliefs. It defines 
the rules which state which govern how the belief state is 
updated on receiving any message. For a successful run of the 
protocol the belief state of communicating parties should 
contain the protocol goals.  
TABLE 5 
NOTATION IN BAN LOGIC FOR NSPK PROOF 
   Kab  
P↔Q K is a good key for communication between participants P and Q. 
#(Np) Nonce value Np is fresh and hence valid. 
P|~X P once said X. 
P |≡ X P believes in X. 
P|⇒X P has jurisdiction over X.  
P Y X P sees X. 
X 
Y If a participant believes in X then he/she believes in Y too. 
BASIC RULES  
• Message Meaning Rule 
 • Nonce Verification Rule 
 • Jurisdiction Rule 
 
Needham-Schroeder Protocol Analysis: The original 
NSPK protocol without the idealisation has been discussed in 
section III. Corresponding idealised protocol from message 2 
is as follows: 
 
PROTOCOL AIM: 
 The aim of NSPK protocol is that the participants 
believe that they share a common secret Kab and also each 
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participant should believe that the other participant also 
believe the same. 
IDEALISED PROTOCOL: 
                 Kab                   Kab              Kab  
2. S → A: {Na, (A ↔ B), # (A ↔ B), {A ↔ B}Kbs} Kas 
       Kab  
3. A → B:{A ↔ B}Kbs 
               Kab  
4. B → A:{Nb, (A ↔ B)}Kab from B 
                Kab  
5. A → B:{Nb, (A ↔ B)}Kab from A  
 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
     Kas                      Kbs                         
1. A |≡  A ↔ S; B |≡  B ↔ S 
                Kas                     Kbs                     Kab              
2. S |≡  A ↔ S; S |≡  B ↔ S; S |≡  A ↔ B 
                           Kab                    
3. A |≡  (S  |⇒ A ↔ B) 
                                    Kab 
4. B |≡  (S  |⇒ A ↔ B)    
                                         Kab 
5. A |≡  (S  |⇒ #(A ↔ B))  
6. A |≡ #(Na); B |≡ #(Nb)  
                    Kab                                  
7. S |≡  #(A ↔ B);  
                          Kab 
8. B |≡  #(A ↔ B) 
 
PROOF: 
We will now use the assumptions and logical postulates and 
apply them to each message. With the help of message (2) and 
assumption (1) we can derive that.  
                              Kab                Kab             Kab 
A Y   {Na, (A ↔ B), #(A ↔ B), {A ↔ B}Kbs}Kas  – (1) 
Using this and applying the logical postulate – message 
meaning rule we can say: 
                                     Kab                Kab        Kab 
A |≡ S |~ {Na, (A ↔ B), #(A ↔ B), {A ↔ B}Kbs}  – (2) 
Now we use assumption (6) and apply freshness rule:  
                             Kab               Kab               Kab 
A|≡ # {Na, (A ↔ B), #(A ↔ B), {A ↔ B}Kbs}Kas  – (3) 
Using (1), (2) and (3) and applying nonce verification rule we 
get: 
                          Kab                                       Kab  
A |≡ S |≡  (A ↔ B) and A |≡ S |≡  #(A ↔ B) 
Using assumptions (3, 5) we apply the jurisdiction rule to 
finally get: 
                  Kab    Kab 
A |≡  (A ↔ B) and A |≡ #(A ↔ B)    - R1 
Now we move on to message (3) and apply logical postulates 
with the help of our assumptions. 
  Kab 
B Y {A ↔ B}Kbs 
Applying the message meaning rule we can derive: 
  
 
                         Kab 
 B |≡ S |~ {A ↔ B}Kbs 
Using assumption (8) we apply nonce verification rule and 
get: 
                         Kab 
B |≡ S |≡ {A ↔ B} 
Using assumption(4) and applying jurisdiction rule we get: 
Kab 
B |≡ {A ↔ B}  - R2 
For message (4) we use the previously derived result (R1) and 
apply message meaning rule to get: 
                            Kab                             
A |≡ B |~ { (A ↔ B)}     – (4) 
Again using (R1) and (4) we apply nonce verification rule to 
get our protocol aim. 
                              Kab                                      Kab                           
 A |≡ B |≡ (A ↔ B) and B |≡ A|≡  (A ↔ B)  -  R3 
 This protocol has an extra assumption, which is that 
B assumes the key B receives from A is fresh (assumption 8).  
So Needham-Schroeder protocol had this flaw in it. 
In this context although B sends Nb encrypted with Ka, the 
assumption is not valid because any adversary is able to trick 
A into decrypting B’s message. This weakness was exploited 
by Lowe in his attack. 
           Kab 
B |≡  #(A ↔ B) 
V.  QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF FORMAL APPROACHES 
The most important feature of approaches under the logical 
inference domain is its independence from automated support. 
They rely primarily on the assumptions taken before the 
analysis of a protocol and capture the notion of validity of data 
items such as nonce and session keys. Strand Spaces captures 
this notion with the help of two partial orderings, namely 
subterm and preceq [24]. The ease of usage of Strand Spaces 
over the BAN logic makes the former more user-friendly. 
 
TABLE 6 
COMPARING THE TWO LOGICAL INFERENCE APPROACHES 
BAN LOGIC STRAND SPACES 
BAN logic does not allow 
modeling of capabilities of 
system penetrator explicitly. 
Strand Spaces model captures all 
the possible adversary behaviour 
independent of the protocol 
being analyzed. Thus all the 
capabilities and limitations of the 
adversary is taken under 
consideration beforehand 
BAN logic analyses the protocol, 
one message at a time. 
Strand Spaces analyses all the 
messages received by a party 
together, using strands. 
BAN logic is not very reliable 
for the verification of security 
protocols, since it proved 
insecure protocols like NSPK 
and Ottway-Rees protocol [28] 
secure.
Strand Spaces on the other hand 
is able to detect flaws in the 
mentioned protocols. 
  
 Both the logic programming and the sequential 
programming approaches are capable of verifying the NSPK 
protocol for Lowe’s attack. An advantage of using ALSP and 
CSP over inference logic approaches is that these specification 
languages allow a system to be described at any level of 
abstraction. It is also worthwhile to state that, the development 
of a protocol specification in ALSP is notably easier than in 
CSP. The latter incorporates far typical syntaxes as compared 
to the former. 
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TABLE 7 
COMPARING THE TWO MODEL CHECKING APPROACHES 
CSP/FDR ALSP 
FDR used with Casper allows 
generating the attacking run 
corresponding to prospective 
security flaws.  
ALSP specification when 
executed on the smodels model 
finder generates a protocol trace 
corresponding to security 
violations. Often, the generation 
of an attacking run from the trace 
itself proves to be a tedious task. 
Complex security properties like 
atomicity & fairness can easily 
be specified using sequential 
programming. 
Specification of such properties 
using the logic programming 
approach is yet to be explored. 
Casper enables a protocol 
designer to specify the protocol 
in the prevalent Alice-Bob 
notation. This considerably 
reduces the time and efforts 
employed in the protocol 
verification. 
Tools to generate the ALSP code 
of a protocol from a more 
abstract description of it is not 
yet been designed. Thus, the 
development of a specification in 
ALSP is more time consuming. 
FDR cannot deal with infinite 
state systems. Thus, CSP cannot 
check any arbitrary protocol. 
The semantics for protocol 
specification in ALSP ensures 
that the specification is 
admissible. Therefore, a case of 
an infinite state system is out 
rightly rejected. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Our intention of future work includes identifying common 
parameters like computational costs, for comparison of 
different formal approaches for verification.  We would also 
extend our work by qualitatively comparing other approaches 
like GNY Logic, Scyther, Murphy and AVISPA. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
We are able to identify and compare the basic limitations and 
advantages of using various formal verification approaches for 
security protocol analysis. This enables us to choose a suitable 
verification approach catering to a particular given scenario. 
For example, in absence of any automated support, we can use 
a logical inference over other model checking approaches. For 
infinite state systems, ALSP is preferred over CSP. As far as 
ease of usage is concerned Casper scores over others. BAN 
logic is not a preferred approach as it has been proven to give 
false result for few protocols. To capture complex goals 
required for fair exchange protocols, CSP and Strand Spaces 
offer a suitable solution. 
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